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The author received the B.S. degree (Finance) in 1964 and the J.D. degree in 1967 from the Uni-
versity of Illinois. He is a member of the American Bar Association, American Judicature Society, Il-
linois State Bar Association, and the newly formed United States Military Trial Lawyers
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This article analyzes current law and problems of judicial review of "internal disciplinary deci-
sions" made by prison officials. The author discusses practical problems of the prisoners' access to the
courts, surveys case law regarding the courts' determination whether or not to review the merits of
such a disciplinary decision, and examines court decisions wherein such disciplinary decisions were re-
viewed on the merits and either condoned or condemned. The author reports an established trend to-
ward increased judicial supervision of prison disciplinary decisions.
It is the purpose of this article to analyze the
current law and problems of judicial review of
decisions made by prison authorities to discipline
lawfully incarcerated prisoners for violations of
prison rules. The analysis will be divided into
three parts:
I. The practical problems of the prison-
ers' access to the courts;
II. The determination by the court that it
will review a disciplinary decision;
III. The determination by the court on the
merits of whether or not the disciplinary
decision was correct.
As will be seen, the courts have not until re-
cently made these distinctions, but the practical
result of the cases indicates an established trend
toward increased judicial supervision of prison
disciplinary decisions. This article will not deal
with the often closely related problems of tort and
criminal liability of prison authorities for their
treatment of lawfully incarcerated prisoners, al-
though these areas may furnish many useful anal-
ogies.'
* The views expressed herein are solely those of the
author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
U.S. Air Force or Department of Defense.
'See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963),
holding that actions under the Federal Tort Claims
Act could be maintained against the United States by
federal prisoners to recover for personal injuries sus-
tained during confinement in prison by reason of
negligence of government employees; and Caldwell &
Brodie, Enforcement of the Criminal Civil Rights Statute,
18 U.S.C. Sec. 242, in Prison Brutality Cases, 52 GEo.
L.J. 706 (1964), for discussions of these areas.
TEE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS or PRISONERS' ACCESS
TO THE COURTS
No discussion of judicial review of prison dis-
ciplinary decisions would be meaningful unless
first placed in the context of the prison environ-
ment:
"Lawful incarceration brings about the neces-
sary withdrawal of many privileges and rights,
a retraction justified by the considerations un-
derlying our penal system." 2
Although prisoners' use of the mails may be con-
trolled and restricted by prison rule,3 it seems
dear that their correspondence with the courts
cannot be so restricted: Prisoners retain an in-
violate right to petition the courts. 4 To the pris-
oner without counsel, the value of his right to
2 Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
3 "Control of the mail to and from inmates is an
essential adjunct of prison administration and the
maintenance of order within the prison." McCoskey
v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 77 (4th Cir. 1964).
41(... a right of access to the courts is one of the
rights a prisoner clearly retains. It is a precious right,
and its administratively unfettered exercise may be of
incalculable importance in the protection of rights even
more precious." Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907
(4th Cir. 1966). "The right and its exercise are ade-
quately secured in the future, we think only if delivery
to a prisoner of incoming matter from a court having
jurisdiction to hear his complaint and the mailing of
his communications to such court are delayed no longer
than the necessities of sorting require. Further delay for
other purposes, such as censorship seem both inappro-
priate and unnecessary." Id. at 907.
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petition depends on his individual creativeness.5
The problem of providing counsel for prisoners is a
separate and perplexing one in itself, and therefore
will be only incidentally treated herein. 6
Another practical hurdle for the petitioning
prisoner is his access to the legal material he needs
to prepare a successful petition Prison authorities
advance various reasons why inmates should not
be permitted to possess legal materials8 Limita-
tion is also imposed on the time and place of in-
mate legal research and preparation. 9 In short,
the courts feel that prisons are not expected to
furnish legal education for inmates so that they
may then object to their confinement or treat-
ment by petitioning the courts.10 Even with these
5 Compare Coleman v. Peyton, supra note 4, where
the court called the prisoner "... articulate and re-
sourceful. .. "362 F.2d at 905, uith Fleming v. Klinger,
363 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1966), where the prisoner filed a
"Demurrer to Appellee's Reply Brief" and the court
said: "This is an admittedly inept appeal....
6 Consider, for example, the possible abuse of court
appointed counsel as in Coleman v. Peyton, supra note
4, where the court appointed four successive attorneys
to represent the prisoner-he found fault with all of
them and discharged each because of an alleged "con-
spiracy" to "... deprive him of his rights." 362 F.
2d at 906.See also the discussion in Roberts v. Pepersack,
256 F. Supp. 415 (D.D. Md. 1966), where the court
states that the appointment of counsel is a privilege
and involves an exercise of the court's discretion, the
court expressing fear of abuse of the privilege by pris-
oners. Id. at 435-37.7 In Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.
1961), "... the court upheld regulations which forbade
all legal materials in the cell, which allowed correspond-
ence with courts, judges and attorneys, but prevented
the retention of any correspondence from these sources
that contained citations to legal authorities... Also,
they were prevented from purchasing or receiving any
legal material except from the publisher. Thus, no gifts
of books were permissible." Roberts v. Pepersack, supra
note 6, at 434.
8 The "fire hazard" in prison cells, Carey v. Settle,
351 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1955); to prevent "jailhouse
lawyers" who might "... exploit and dominate weaker
prisoners of inferior intelligence." Hatfield v. Bailleaux,
supra note 7, at 639. The latter reason seems more
justified than the former: "Prior to the establishment
of this 'writ room,' it appears that several prisoners,
acting as 'jailhouse lawyers,' were charging for their
service and advice, which necessarily, was more often
than not, faulty." Ex Parte Wilson, 235 F. Supp. 988,
988-989 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
9 A rule that no petitions could be mailed which were
not prepared in the prison "writ room" was upheld in
Ex Parte Wilson, supra note 8, at 989.
10 The following statements are typical: "Prisons are
not intended, nor should they be permitted, to serve the
purpose of providing inmates with information about
methods of securing release therefrom." Roberts v.
Pepersack, supra note 6, at 433; ".. . he has no due
process right to spend his prison time or utilize prison
facilities in an effort to discover a ground for overturn-
ing a presumptively valid judgment." Hatfield v.
Bailleaux, supra note 7, at 641.
practical restrictions imposed on prison inmates,
abuses of the "inviolate" right to petition the
courts do occur."
To compensate for the prisoner's regulated en-
vironment, his usual absence of qualified counsel
and lack of legal sophistication, the courts have
formulated special rules of pleading applicable to
prisoner petitions that emphasize liberal construc-
tion.12 This special "liberal pleading rule" has
allowed courts to correct obvious legal blunders,13
and even recast the prison petitioner's allegations
to state entirely different claims than those ini-
tially held to be insufficient.14 As will be seen, the
courts may apply the "liberal pleading rule"
technique to avoid questions of subject matter
jurisdiction and the justiciability of questions
involving the internal administration of prisons. 5
THE DETERMINATION BY THE COURT THAT IT WILL
RE vrw A PRISON Discp'n wAry DECISION
Assuming the petitioning prisoner can overcome
the practical disadvantages of his environment as
outlined above, he must then convince the court
that it should review the issues raised by his peti-
tion. This is the prisoner's most difficult task.
i See, e.g., the two page footnote in Robert v.
Pepersack, supra note 6, at 434-35, listing the citations
of cases petitioned by prisoner Roberts during the pre-
vious decade, in both the federal and state courts.
2 "Since the plaintiffs are inmates of a penal institu-
tion, the pleadings lack the legal niceties of the normal
pleadings in this Court. Therefore the complaint will be
given a reasonably liberal reading in ascertaining
whether claims have been stated upon which relief
could be granted." Long v. Katzenbach, 258 F. Supp.
89, 91 (M.D. Pa. 1966). "Interpreting the complaint
broadly, as we must... " Wright v. McMann, 257 F.
Supp. 739,742 (N.D.N.Y. 1966). See also note 5 supra.
i1 "The traditional function of the writ of habeas
corpus is to test the legality of the detention. It is
inappropriate to the kind of injunctive relief these
petitioners seek. Unlearned inmates of penal institu-
tions, however, are usually ignorant of the legal niceties
of the procedural rules in the courts. If one presents in
his own behalf a petition which clearly merits some
relief, he ought not to fail entirely because he miscon-
ceives the nature of the proceeding or mislabels his
petition. If the petition substantively is one for injunc-
tive relief, the court most certainly has a discretionary
right to treat it as such, despite the fact that the untu-
tored petitioner has mistakenly designated it as a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Roberts v. Pegelow,
313 F.2d 548, 549-50 (4th Cir. 1963) (footnotes
omitted).
14 "At times, the court has even phrased the allega-
tions in terms of constitutionally-guaranteed rights of
which Roberts has perhaps never heard. Still, despite
this extremely liberal interpretation, Roberts' complaint
remains insufficient." Roberts v. Pepersack, supra note
6, at 436.
15 See pp. 159 infra.
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The "Hands Off" Doctrine and Its Exceptions
There can be no doubt that decisions by prison
authorities to discipline lawfully incarcerated
prisoners for prison rule violations are decisions
involving the internal administration of prisons.
In most states, and in the federal system, the re-
sponsibility for administration of the respective
prison systems is delegated by statute to the execu-
tive branch of government.16 These statutes dele-
gate broad rule-making powers to the agencies
charged with internal prison discipline." The prob-
lem that continues to plague the courts, both
stateu and federal," is the scope of delegation of
power. The legal development of judicial review of
prison disciplinary decisions originates with hold-
ings based squarely on the concept of complete
delegation. The case of Williams v. Steele offers
perhaps the dearest example:
"Since the prison system of the United States
is entrusted to the Bureau of Prisons under the
discretion of the Attorney General ... the
courts have no power to supervise the disci-
pline of the prisons nor to interfere with their
discipline, but only on habeas corpus to deliver
from prison those who are illegally detained." 21
Although the holding of the court in Williams
was somewhat narrower than the above quota-
16 IL. Rav. STAT. ch. 108, §§ 10 & 16 (1965); 18
U.S.C. §§ 4001 & 4042 (1964).
17 In Illinois, The Department of Public Safety; the
federal prisons are administered by The Federal Bureau
of Prisons. See statutes cited in note 16 supra.
(1In George v. People, 167 IlI. 447, 47 N.E. 741
(1897), the court upheld the rule-making power of the
prison commission and the disciplining of inmates for
internal rule violations, stating that such rule-making
was not an unpermitted exercise of judicial power.
19 "The federal prison system is operated in all its
aspects by the Attorney General, part of the executive
branch of government, and not by the judiciary."
United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir.
1965) (emphasis added).
20 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952).
2Id. at 34. When rehearing was petitioned in the
Williams case, the court seemingly took the opportu-
nity to state the rule as an absolute:
The petition for rehearing implies that our opinion
holds that there is no judicial remedy open to a per-
son who has been legally convicted and committed
for the commission of a crime and who is thereafter
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of our Constitution. We do not consider our
opinion susceptible to the construction, but in order
that there be no question about it, we deem it desir-
able to say so in so many words.
Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 917 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 822 (1952).
tion would indicate,n this case seems to be the de-
finitive beginning of the rule that because of com-
plete delegation of prison administration to the
executive, the courts have no power or jurisdiction
to review the disciplinary decisions of the prison
authorities. The most unusual feature in the his-
tory of the Williams rule is that while the courts
have repeatedly recited it as if it were binding,
they have seldom allowed it to preclude jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter altogether, as the
rule would seem to suggest. A recent example of
this judicial lip-service to the Williams rule is
Heft v. .Parker,2 in which a federal prisoner sub-
mitted a "Petition to Enjoin Cruel and Unusual
Punishment," alleging a denial of proper diet
while being held in a "punishment cell." Since the
prisoner was at trial receiving adequate meals, he
asked for an injunction against subjection to an
improper diet in the future. The court framed the
facts alleged as presenting an issue of the internal
discipline of prisons, and mechanically applied the
Williams rule." Logically, the court needed no
further grounds to dismiss the petition, but pro-
ceeded to justify the result on constitutional
grounds.25 The technique used in Heft v. Parker
dearly indicates that the court was not following
the Williams rule to the letter, even though the
result of the case is the same as if the court had
done so.
Much preferred to the Heft v. Parker approach
are cases which restate or make exceptions to the
Williams rule, frame the facts in terms of the re-
statement or exception, then grant or deny relief
accordingly. Such a case is Childs v. Pegelow,21
where Black Muslim petitioners alleged that they
were being punished because the warden of their
federal prison had not provided them special diets
2 "The question involved is whether the writ of
habeas corpus may be used for that purpose. We hold
that it may not." Williams v. Steele, supra note 21,
194 F.2d at 917. Incidentally, this is still probably
correct, since there are now more appropriate, recog-
nized remedies available to obtain judicial review. See
pp. 158 infra.
23 258 F. Supp. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
24 ",... this case involves the internal discipline of a
prison... it is not the function of the courts to super-
intend the ... discipline of prisoners." Heft v. Parker,
supra note 23 at 508.
25 "Moreover, the mere allegation of an inadequate
diet with accompanying loss of weight is certainly not
enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Finally, the prisoner states that he is being fed ade-
quately at this time, rendering the case moot ......
Ibid.




and dining hours as he had allegedly agreed to do.
The court stated the general rule to be that "except
in extreme cases" the courts will not interfere with
the internal discipline of prisons.? Next, the court
defined "extreme cases" as those "petitions alleg-
ing deprivations of constitutionally and legally
protected rights." " Then, after the court reviewed
the facts as developed from the pleadings and hear-
ing record, it was determined that an "extreme
case" was not presented by the petitioners and
therefore relief would be denied accordingly." It
should also be noted that the court in Childs v.
Pegelow liberally construed the pleadings and the
hearing record to amplify the existence of any
possible "extreme case" that could be stated. 0
There have been many exceptions made to the
Williams rule since its pronouncement in 1952.
Perhaps the most complete statement of the cur-
rent status of the justiciability rule is as follows:
"The rule that.., courts do not intervene in
matters involving prison discipline is ... sub-
ject to limitation. What is needed to overcome
the prison discipline defense has been stated
in various ways... : 'deprivation of a con-
stitutional right,'... 'exceptional circum-
stances,'. . . if the acts of prison officials are
not 'reasonably necessary to effectuate the
purpose of imprisonment,'... 'violation of a
legal right or an abuse of discretion by prison
officials,'... 'extreme' circumstances,...
'only in a rare and exceptional situation,'...
'unreasonable regulations'....1i
On the other hand, there still seems to be current
2Id. at 489. It is interesting to note that the court
cited Williams v. Steele as authority for their statement
of the rule!
2Id. at 490.
29The court held that the facts developed did
"... not rise to the level of constitutional rights in-
volving due process of law and equal protection of the
laws such as those recognized and protected in the few
cases where the courts have carved out exceptions to the
accepted rule of non-interference with prison adminis-
tration." Ibid.
"[T]he facts appear to have been fully developed,
notwithstanding the lack of counsel for petitioners,
and support the conclusion... that the complaints
were... unjustified." Ibid. See also Roberts v. Pege-
low, supra note 13, at 550, where the court treated the
petitions as asking injunctive relief though mislabeled
'petitions for labeas corpus," and Long v. Xatzenbach,
supra note 12, where liberal construction by the court
permitted statement of First Amendment claims; the
court held no rights were violated and denied relief.
See generally the discussion of the 'iberal pleading rule"
pp. 159-161 supra.
"Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 426 (D.
Md. 1966).
authority" that would purport to follow the strict
non-justiciability rule of the Williams case. How-
ever, a careful reading of these opinions reveals
that the respective courts did not really apply the
Williams rule absolutely; in each case there was a
review of the facts and merely a decision that relief
should be denied. Hence, these cases illustrate olny
the same logical fallacy that appeared in Heft v.
Parker."3 That is, the courts applied the strict non-
justiciability rule when they meant only to hold
that the facts did not justify a judicial intervention
into the particular disciplinary decision.
It should not be concluded that since the current
exceptions to the strict non-justiciability rule of
Williams have been stated,u there remains no
problem of defining justiciability. There seem to be
at least two reasons, one quite practical and the
other theoretical, why problems remain. First of
all, the courts obviously need to be apprised of the
exceptions that have been made to the strict non-
justiciability rule in order either to follow an estab-
lished exception or create a new one. This is the
key that will allow a court to initially intervene
into a particular disciplinary decision. Perhaps lack
of apprisal is to be explained by the corresponding
lack of legal resource and sophistication of the av-
erage petitioning prisoner." The prisoners them-
selves probably do not know that there has been a
definite change of thinking in justiciability con-
cepts. But to the prisoner with counsel, it would
seem risky for the attorney to assume that the
court would only pay lip service to the strict non-
justiciability rule and that the result of the case
would be the same, no matter what rule the court
applies. It should also be remembered that the
"liberal pleading rule" would not be applied to
petitions prepared and filed by an attorney. Sec-
ondly, each time the court decides to make or fol-
low an exception to the strict non-justiciability
rule, it strikes a delicate balance between the enor-
mously practical problems of internal prison dis-
cipline administration and the basic human rights
2 "[P]rison officials must have wide discretion in the
promulgation of rules to govern the inmates, even to
the point of denying basic constitutional rights." United
States ex rel. Henson v. Myers, 224 F. Supp. 826, 827
(E.D. Pa. 1965). No romantic or sentimental view of
constitutional rights... should induce a court to inter-
fere with the necessary disciplinary regime established
by the prison officials." Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d
906,908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
"Supra note 23, at 508.
4 
4 Roberts v. Pepersack, supra note 31.
35 See p. 161 supra, "The Practical Problems of
Prisoners' Access to the Courts."
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of prisoners.36 Each intervention by the courts into
the administration of prison discipline seems to be
contrary to the dear meaning of the "exclusive"
delegation of prison administration to the execu-
tive branch.n Only the astonishing recurrence of
appalling disciplinary decisions by prison authori-
ties demands this increased judicial supervision.38
As for the future of any non-justiciability rule, a
New York federal district court may have struck a
fatal blow."5 In a prison religious freedom case, the
court in effect ordered a complete judicial pre-emp-
tion of the "exclusive" delegation of prison admin-
istration to the executive branch. 40 It is too soon to
tell what impact this technique, and the court's
expanded concept of jurisdiction,4 will have on the
continued existence of a non-justiciability rule. The
case may be too radical in its departure from even
36 Prison discipline is essential and certain rights
must be curtailed in order to achieve it. But some-
where along the line there exists a still finer line
that separates mere matters of discipline from
arbitrary and capricious disregard of human
rights. It is this line for which federal courts must
diligently search while treading about in the twi-
light zone that separates interference with a
state's autonomy in policing its own penal system
from the enforcement of federally guaranteed
rights.
United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F.
Supp. 7, 12 (E.D. Pa. 1965). The "twilight zone"
described above has also been defined as a "vast no
man's land" that lies "between the constitutional rights
of a prisoner on the one hand, and the disciplinary
rights of the authorities on the other hand." Beckett v.
Kearney, 247 F. Supp. 415,427 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
37 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 108, §§ 10 & 16 (1965).
38 Pp. 161-164, infra, analyze the scope and sub-
stantive rules of the cases that review the merits
of prison disciplinary decisions.
39 SaMarion v. McGinnis, 253 F. Supp. 738 (W.D.-
N.Y. 1966).
40The Commissioner of Correction is directed to
promulgate, put into effect, and file with the
Clerk of this court, within thirty (30) days, a
set of rules and regulations to govern the plain-
tiffs and others similarly situated in the prac-
tice of their religion. Those rules and regulations
should fully recognize those rights which nor-
mally attend the belief in and practice of a
religion in a state prison system, but the rules and
regulations may limit and restrict the exercise
and practice of those religious rights by Black
Muslim inmates in such a manner or measure as
is necessary to the protection and preservation of
prison security, discipline or other legitimate
prison interest.
Id. at 741.
4 1 "[T]he court will continue to retain jurisdiction
in this matter, will direct that the plaintiffs and their
counsel be furnished with a copy of the Commissioner's
rules and regulations, and will permit the plaintiffs
at any time, on proper notice, to move for such other
and further relief as may become necessary." Id. at 742.
the current exceptions to the strict non-justiciabil-
ity rule. 2 In any event, the case shows clearly the
current judicial disfavor with the competency of
prison administrative decisions and the strict non-
justiciability rule.
Other Objections to Judicial Review of Prisot Dis-
ciplinary Decisions
Assuming that a prisoner is able to present a
"justiciable" prison disciplinary decision to the
court, as discussed above, other objections can be
raised to preclude him from obtaining judicial re-
view.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. In the
federal prison system there is a method to channel
prisoners' complaints up through the Bureau of
Prisons. Called the "prisoner's mail box," 41 the
unexercised existence of this administrative remedy
has often been relied on by the defendant and the
court to preclude judicial review on the merits of
the prisoner's petition for reliefA When "good
time" is forfeited for a prison rule violation,45 the
time may be restored by an administrative remedy
established by statute.46 Prisoner's complaints in
the federal courts of illegal "good time" forfeitures
42 Roberts v. Pepersack, supra note 31.
43 As stated in the Mail Regulations, Section g.,
rev. February 23, 1944: "The Prisoner's Mail
Box in each institution is designed to provide
any inmate the opportunity to write directly,
without inspection by institutional authorities,
to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,...
regarding any matter of importance to the indi-
vidual, to the inmate group as a whole, or any
matter of importance affecting the institution
and its personnel or officials. The prisoner's
mail box is open to all inmates regardless of
their status."
Green v. United States, 283 F.2d 687, 688 (3d Cir.
1960).
44 "[A]ppellant has failed to exhaust his administra-
tive remedies. Under the regulations promulgated by
the Bureau of Prisons, there is available to all prisoners
the right of the "Prisoner's Mail Box. This procedure
sets up an effective means of review of actions of local
prison authorities." Ibid. See also Lowe v. Hiatt, 77 F.
Supp. 303 (M.D. Pa. 1948), where the "prisoner's
mail box" defense was apparently first used.
4 18 U.S.C. § 4165 (1964), provides for forfeiture
of "good time" upon rule violation by an inmate.
Incidentally, the forfeiture of "good time" earned can
make a substantial difference in the total time served
in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 4164 (1964) provides for a re-
duction in the total term of sentence of from five to
ten days, for each month served, depending on the
length of sentence. Thus, with maximum "good time"
earned, a prisoner would serve only seven and one-half
years of a ten year sentence.
46 18 U.S.C. § 4166 (1964), allows restoration by the
Attorney General upon recommendation from the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons.
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have been dismissed for failure to exhaust this
administrative remedy. 47
Although there are no cases on this subject in
Illinois, the dear language of the delegation
statutes establishes an administrative remedy for
the prisoner's complaint.4s Presumably, if an
inmate of an Illinois prison sought judicial review
of a prison disciplinary decision in an Illinois
court, the court would insist on exhaustion of
administrative remedies provided by the delega-
tion statute as a condition precedent to relief.
49
In both federal and state prison systems, it
would be difficult to ascertain how effective these
administrative remedies really are. It would at
least seem certain that inmates and prison officials
would have differing views of the administrative
effectiveness. The sheer quantity of recent prisoner
petitions in the courts as well as the recurrence of
the same kinds of complaints tends to indicate
that these remedies are not as effective as some
courts have assumed.50 It is the author's opinion
that although these remedies were probably
created to satisfy the requirements of due process
within the exclusive delegation of prison adminis-
tration to the executive branch, they no longer
serve to practically guarantee the basic human
rights of prisoners.
Seeking Review in theWrong Court-Doctrines
of Federal Abstention. There exists a general reluc-
tance of the federal courts to hear the complaints of
state prisoners. This reluctance was most clearly
expressed in Siegal v. Ragen,1 a Seventh Circuit
case:
"The Government of the United States is not
concerned with, nor has it power to control or
regulate the internal discipline of the penal
institutions of its constituant states. All such
powers are reserved to the individual states." 52
The Siegel rule sounds as if it is a special appli-
47 Smoake v. Willingham, 359 F.2d 386, 386-87
(10th Cir. 1966), and Cannon v. Willingham, 358
F.2d 719, 720 (10th Cir. 1966), both held that the
district courts were "without jurisdiction" when this
remedy had not been exhausted.
I4 . REv. STAT. ch 108, §§ 10 & 16 (1965).
49In a case involving an Illinois state prisoner
against his warden but in the federal court, it was
said: "It does not appear that the plaintiffs have ever
... requested an inquiry into the misconduct of the
defendant...." Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F. 2d 785, 788
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990, rehearing denied,
340 U.S. 847 (1950).
10 See p. 161 infra.
5 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950).
52Id. at 788.
cation of the strict non-justiciability rule of
Williams v. Steele5" to stale prisoners petitioning
in the federal courts. It should be remembered
that the Williams rule was applied to a petitioning
federal prisoner by a federal court. As for the
similarity of the rules, later interpretations of the
Siegel rule are similar to the subsequent exceptions
made to the Williams rule. 4 It is difficult to
determine from the cases whether there is any
substantive difference between the federal absten-
tion doctrine of Siegel and the non-justiciability
rule of Williams.5 The answer may hinge on the
procedure for raising the respective prisoners'
complaints in the federal courts."6 The state
prisoner will ordinarily proceed under the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1871.1 The right of action
granted thereunder is for "--the deprivation of
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws." -s Thus, it may be that
the federal courts are equating the federal absten-
tion rule with the failure of the state prisoner to
state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871. Stated affirmatively, the defense of federal
abstention would seem overcome by a good cause
of action under the Civil Rights Act. No case can
be found that purposely attempts to draw this
parallel, but there are indications that this may
well be the test used by the federal courts hearing
state prisoner complaints.
For example, In Rivers v. Royster, 59 a state
prisoner brought a civil rights action to enjoin his
warden to allow the prisoner to receive a nonsub-
versive Negro newspaper. The right to receive such
newspapers was granted by state statute. The
court dealt with the abstention defense and the
civil rights cause of action with the same language:
"The alleged discrimination involves a constitu-
tional right which overides the court's reluctance
to interfere with prison administration and disci-
pline." 60
a 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952), supra notes 20 & 21,
discussed in text at 154 supra.
54"Except under exceptional circumstances, in-
ternal matters in state penitentiaries are the sole
concern of the state and federal courts will not inquire
concerning them." United States v. Ragen, 337 F.2d
425, 426 (7th Cir. 1964) (emphasis added). Notice the
similarity to Roberts v. Pepersack, supra note 31.55 Both the Williams and the Siegel rules seem to be
grounded on the traditional reluctance of the courts
to intervene where they have limited power to super-
vise the enforcement of their decisions.56 See generally pp. 159 infra.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
8 Ibid.




Judge Clark of the Second Circuit moreprecisely
defined the parallel that seems to exist between the
federal abstention defense and the civil rights
cause of action in Pierce v. LaValle.& In that case,
state prisoners brought a civil rights action for
religious persecution allegedly inflicted upon them.
The court below dismissed the case because the
issues should have been heard in the state court
as they concerned only routine matters of state
prison discipline. On appeal, Judge Clark reasoned:
"A considerable body of authority... holds
that a state prisoner complaining of improper
prison treatment must seek relief in the
state court....
In part, these decisions may be explained on
the ground that they do not involve any
violation of a constitutional right." 62
This kind of analysis indicates that the court in
Pierce considered a good cause of action under the
Civil Rights Act as the only type of state prison
discipline case that a federal court should hear, all
others being matters for the state courts, the
federal courts abstaining.63 The reasoning of the
Pierce decision was followed and refined somewhat
in the recent case of Wright v. McMann," where a
petitioning state prisoner in the federal court under
the Civil Rights Act was denied relief since there
was no finding that a constitutional right had been
violated and it appeared that the plaintiff had an
available state court remedy. 5 The court in
Wright went on to justify the decision on still
another ground: "[N]o exceptional circumstances
are shown in the complaint which would exempt
this action from the general rule that federal
courts will not interfere with the internal manage-
ment of state prisons . ," 66
This last justification in the Wright case seems
to complete the reasoning of the federal courts
when they are petitioned by state prisoners. It
61293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
62Id. at 235.
13 The court must still review the facts of the dis-
ciplinary decision in order to determine whether there
is stated a good cause of action under the Civil Rights
Act. This is the same process the federal courts have
undertaken to make exceptions to the strict non-
justiciability rule of Williams v. Steele, supra note 53.
64 257 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1966).
65 "The decision here may rest on either or both of
the following conclusions. (1) The complaint makes no
sufficient showing of the denial of plaintiff's consti-
tutional rights. (2) Plaintiff's remedy, if any, lies in the
state courts." Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 747.
appears that if there is no claim stated under the
Civil Rights Act there can be no "exceptional
circumstances" which would justify the interven-
tion of the federal court into state prison ad-
ministration and the prisoner's remedy lies in the
state court. Stating the conclusion another way, a
good cause of action under the Civil Rights Act
gives rise to an "exceptional circumstance"
where the federal court will not abstain from state
prison discipline cases and the petitioner need not
pursue his state court remedy.67 It should be
noted, however, that by making the above con-
clusions the federal courts do not start with the
assumption that they have no power to review the
facts of the particular disciplinary decision com-
plained of. Thus, the seemingly strict federal
abstention rule of Siegel v. Ragens has undergone a
similar process of erosion as has the strict non-
justiciability rule of Williams v. Steele.69 Hence,
the power to review the facts of the particular
disciplinary decision is assumed 0 while the question
that determines the conclusions stated above is
whether the facts alleged compel the federal court
to take action in the case.3
Procedure and Remedies for Seeking Relief
Assuming the petitioning prisoner is able to
present a case to the court which will enable the
court to take some action, he must usually proceed
under a theory that will facilitate the court's
action. The remedies and procedures used by the
prisoner will necessarily vary, depending on
whether he is a state or federal prisoner and
whether he petitions a state or federal court.
67The petitioner's rights are federal constitu-
tional rights based upon the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983; therefore, no
exhaustion of state remedies is required. "It
is no answer that the state has a law which if
enforced would give relief. The federal remedy
is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked."
Rivers v. Royster, supra note 59, at 594, citing Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
6s Supra note 52.69 Supra note 53.
70 See generally Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946),
for the proposition that the federal courts have juris-
diction to determine if they have jurisdiction: "[T]he
court must assume jurisdiction to decide whether the
allegations state a cause of action on which the court
can grant relief as well as to determine the issues of
fact arising in the controversy." Id. at 682.
" Pp. 161-164, infra, categorize the kinds of facts
that need be alleged in attempting to get relief
from a particular disciplinary decision.
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Federal Prisoners Petitioning Federal Courts.
The prevailing rule in the federal courts is that no
review of prison disciplinary decisions can be
obtained by the application for a writ of kabeas
corpus 2 The reason given for the rule is that the
writ is available only when the applicant is
illegally detained and not to review a prison
disciplinary action imposed on a legally incar-
cerateca prisonerYl The "liberal pleading rule"
adopted by the federal courts has allowed review
on the merits, however, where it appeared that
the prisoner had mislabeled his pleading. 4
A federal prisoner cannot rely on the Civil
Rights Act of 187175 as these remedies apply only
to the deprivation of civil rights under color of
law by a "state or territory;" hence, they do not
furnish federal prisoners a remedy7 A new pro-
cedural device has been approved for federal
prisoner use in the federal courts by the court in
Walker v. BlackwellU That case held in part, and
the government apparently conceded, that a
federal prisoner can proceed against his prison
officials under the federal -mandamus statute.78
The court labeled the petitions as "actions in the
nature of mandamus" even though the prisoners
had labeled them "Motions for Mandatory In-
junctions." It is difficult to determine from the case
whether the court merely applied the "liberal
pleading rule" or intended to allow a new federal
prisoner procedural theory. 9 At any rate, the
scope of the court's determination under the
mandamus remedy seems as broad as under the
traditional injunction proceeding.50 It is too soon
72This rule reflects the narrow holding of Williams v.
Steele, supra note 22.73 Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548, 549 (4th Cir.
1963).
74 The "liberal pleading rule" would not apply, how-
ever, to save an attorney's mistaken remedy.
7S42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
76 Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66, 67 (5th Cir.
1966).
7 Ibid.
7828 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964): "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the'
United States or any agency thereof to perform a
duty owed to the plaintiff."
7
9 A strong dissent criticized the remedy primarily
because it was argued only as an afterthought on
appeal, and had not been raised in the lower court.
This would indicate that the majority seized upon the
mandamus theory to save an otherwise defective peti-
tion, because they thought review was needed. Walker
v. Blackwell, supra note 76, at 69-70.
We conclude, therefore, that the district court
should grant a hearing to these Appellants,
each of whose petitions states a cause of action
to determine the total impact of this decision on
the federal courts and prison petitioners, but it
should be noted that several other cases have
proceeded on the mandamus theory.8' These cases
could represent an attempt to expand the scope
of review that the federal courts exercise over
federal prison disciplinary decisions, in that
complaints not rising to constitutional dimension
concerning disciplinary decisions could be brought
under the broad language of the mandamus
statute.P The statute certainly offers a procedural
avenue to increased judicial supervision of federal
prisons by the federal courts.
By far the majority of complaints asserted by
federal prisoners in the federal courts are raised
by injunction proceedings against a named prison
official, usually the warden. The jurisdictional
basis for these actions is seldom, if ever, made
dear by the cases5 Characteristically, actions in
federal courts are limited to those brought in
strict compliance with jurisdictional require-
ments.84 Although not noted by the courts that
under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1361. The judge can
then determine if the prison officials have vi-
olated Appellants' right to possess their Muslim
beliefs and if the rules and regulations imposed
on these prisoners are reasonable and justifiable
in the administration of a large prison popula-
tion, maintenance of discipline, and control of
any dangers and hazards presented.
Walker v. Blackwell, supra note 76, at 69.
81Both Graham v. Willingham, 265 F. Supp. 763
(D. Kan. 1967), and Long v. Katzenbach, 258 F.
Supp. 89 (M.D. Pa. 1966), allowed the mandamus
theory of relief without comment.
82Supra note 78. However, the cases proceeding
under this section so far have involved constitutional
complaints of prisoners.83Jurisdiction for the federal district courts is
defined by statute in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-61 (1964).
Federal prisoner petitions for injunctive relief would
not seem to meet the diversity of citizenship require-
ments of § 1331, or the $10,000 requirement of § 1332,
even though these petitions typically involve a "fed-
eral question." The first three sub-sections of § 1343
were meant to give the district courts jurisdiction over
actions commenceable under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1964), and hence are available
for "state action" alone. The last subsection of § 1343
is of doubtful application as well, as it is meant to
".. .secure equitable... relief under an Act of Con-
gress providing for the protection of civil rights...."
Can a federal prisoner alleging a constitutional depriva-
tion by a federal prison official use this sub-section?
Are constitutional rights "Acts of Congress?"
84 The federal courts are courts of limikdjurisdidtion:
"The presumption is that the court lacks jurisdiction
in a particular case until it has been demonstrated
that jurisdiction over the subject matter exists."
WRIGHr, FEDERAL CouRs § 7 (1963). The court is even
obliged to dismiss cases for want of jurisdiction on its




hear these cases, jurisdiction is probably founded
on some theory of the federal "all writs" statute.85
The jurisdiction could be based on other theories,
however. It could be surmized that federal prison-
ers at least have the same injunctive remedy
against their keepers as do state prisoners who
petition the federal courts under the Civil Rights
Act. The right of federal prisoners to bring an
injunction may be nothing more than a practical
manifestation of the "inviolate" right of prisoners
to petition the court,86 even though it has no
express statutory jurisdictional authorization.
Finally, the federal courts, in allowing federal
prisoners to petition for injunctions, may be
exercising some form of "supervisory control"
over an essentially federal domain-the federal
prison system.67 Whatever the basis of jurisdic-
tion, a federal prisoner can dearly petition for an
injunction against a federal prison official for
deprivation of constitutional rights due to a
prison disciplinary decision.7
State Prisoners Petitioning Federal Courts. As
with the federal prisoner, the state prisoner cannot
generally seek review of a prison disciplinary
decision by a federal writ of habeas corpus.8 9 An
important exception to this rule, however, seems
to be developing in the federal courts for the
solitary confinement situation. In Johnson v.
Avery,90 a state prisoner petitioned the federal
court to be released from solitary confinement. 9'
86 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a): "The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respec-
tive jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." Note, however, that this statute
does not expand the statutory jurisdiction of the district
courts.
8r Supra note 4.
87 Similar to the concept of "protective jurisdiction"
that the federal courts exert over labor-management
relations. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills
353 U.S. 448 (1957); WRiGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 20
(1963).88 See Childs v. Pegelow 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir.
1963) (injunction sought to enforce mealtime and diet
agreement for Black Muslim inmates); Roberts v.
Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963) (petition con-
strued as request for an injunction to cease interference
with religious practices); Heft v. Parker, 258 F. Supp.
507 (M.D. Pa. 1966) (prisoner filed "Petition to En-
join Cruel and Unusual Punishment").
89 This is because the legality of the incarceration is
not challenged; only the punishment for breach of
prison discipline.
90 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
1The petitioner alleged that he had been placed
in solitary confinement because he had helped other
prisoners prepare writs of habeas corpus in violation of a
prison regulation. The court held the regulation in-
valid as interfering with the right of state prisoners to
The court ordered his release by habeas corpus.
The defendant custodian objected to such release
on the grounds that since the prisoner could not be
released from total confinement, habeas corpus
was improper. The court reasoned that:
"[T]he relief sought in the present case is, in
fact, to release the petitioner from custody-
from the very real custody of solitary confine-
ment which is, in a sense, a jail within a jail.
[E]ven though the petitioner is lawfully con-
fined in the penitentiary, he has a right not to
have confinement made more burdensome by
being placed for an indefinite period in solitary
confinement for violating a prison regula-
tion . . . 92
One problem facing a state prisoner in solitary
confinement who attempts to utilize the federal
habeas corpus remedy to rejoin the rest of the
prison population, is the requirement that state
court remedies be exhausted before application
for the federal writ is made. 3 The court in Johnsot,
however, liberally construed this requirement,
and it is apparent that the judge took judicial
notice of the inadequate remedies available for
the petitioner in the state courts.94
By far the most popular remedy used to obtain
judicial review of state prison disciplinary de-
cisions in the federal courts is an action under the
federal Civil Rights Act of 1871.9' Inmates of
the federal habeas corpus remedy granted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2242 (1964). ibid.
9 Id. at 785. The court merely more broadly de-
fined "confinement" or "detention" to allow its action
to fit within the traditional definition of 'habeas corpus.
Another recent case accomplishes the same result,
but does not indicate what remedy the petitioner used.
In Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966),
the court ordered the release of the petitioner from
solitary confinement so that he could rejoin the rest of
the prison population on the "jail within a jail" theory.
The petitioner had spent four years in solitary con-
finement for prison rule violations.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964), requires exhaustion or
absence of state remedies before application for federal
habeas corpus.
14,"It is not clear whether the petitioner has pre-
sented his claim of illegal confinement under maximum
security to the state courts, but in any event under
present state rulings the habeas corpus remedy in
Tennessee would not be adequate to reach this question
on its merits." Johnson v. Avery, supra note 90, at 784.
95 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). This statute enables the
state prisoner to maintain ".... an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,"
for "... the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws .... "
Jurisdiction to hear these cases is granted to the district
courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
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state prisons are within the protection of this Act,
and may institute actions under it.91 The majority
of state prisoner actions under the Act are petitions
for injunctive relief, while some of the complaints
ask for damages. There has been much judicial
criticism of the damage aspect of the remedy
because of its possible abuses when used in bad
faith.17 Other possibilities exist for abuse when
state prisoners utilized the Civil Rights Act.
Unlike federal habeas corpus, no exhaustion of
state court remedies is required in order to main-
tain an action."8 Also, if the state prisoner can
successfully petition to proceed infora pauperis,9 9
he may maintain the action at no cost to him. To
assure that good faith claims can be brought under
the Civil Rights Act by the indigent prisoner,
however, the cost of possible abuse seems justifi-
able.
State Prisoners Petitioning State Courts. Be-
cause the state prisoner need not exhaust his state
court remedies before he petitions the federal
courts under the Civil Rights Act,109 the state
court remedies seem to be of little practical value
to the state prisoner. Indeed, there seem to be no
reported cases in Illinois where a state prisoner
has attempted to seek judicial review of a prison
disciplinary decision. It can be concluded that the
extremely broad relief available under federal
habeas corpus for solitary confinement situations
and Civil Rights Act"' for constitutional depriva-
96 See Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir.
1963); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601 (9th
Cir. 1963).
s' See Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.
Cal. 1964), where the plaintiff state prisoner, in a
fifty-page complaint prepared at public expense,
sought damages of $2.5 million dollars against all the
judges, jurors, witnesses, jailers and others who had
anything to do with his imprisonment-forty-four
defendants in all! The complaint was dismissed; the
court said "The plaintiff's complaint is frivolous and
downright malicious." 227 F. Supp. at 26. See also
the recent case of Cullum v. Dep't of Corrections, 267
F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Cal. 1967), also seeking $2.5 million
dollars in damages by a state prisoner. The complaint
was similarly dismissed.
9 Supra note 67.
99 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1964), provides that: "Any
court of the United States may authorize the commence-
ment ... of any suit... without prepayment of fees...
by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to
pay such costs.... Such affidavit shall state the
nature of the action ... and affiant's belief that he is
entitled to redress." This statute would apply to both
state and federal prisoners who petition the federal
court.
1o Supra note 67.
101The coverage under the federal Civil Rights
Act is so complete that a denial of access to a state
court remedy, if one were available, is a violation of the
Act. Stiltner v. Rhay, supra note 96.
tions, has practically pre-empted the state remedial
need and few have developed. Presumably, how-
ever, an Illinois prisoner could seek an injunction
or mandamus in the circuit court to seek review.
The Illinois delegation statutes seem to confer
clear non-discretionary duties on the Department
of Public Safety that should be enforceable by
mandamus} 02
Federal Prisoners Petitioning State Courts.
There seem to be no cases reported where a federal
prisoner has attempted to seek judicial review of a
prison disciplinary decision in a state court.
Presumably, the same considerations that seem
to give the federal courts "protective jurisdiction"
over the federal prison system would pre-empt the
state courts from exerting any jurisdiction in this
area of "federal domain." 103
Comparison of Remedies Available to Federal
and State Prisoners. The conclusion seems in-
escapable, however incongruous, that today's
state prisoner has greater opportunity to petition
the federal courts for judicial review of a particular
prison disciplinary decision than does his federal
counterpart. The state prisoner's remedial ad-
vantage is simply a result of the greater attention
that state prison disciplinary cases have received
in the federal courts. As will be seen,' remedies
are created and allowed largely by the compelling
nature of the facts involved in a particular disci-
plinary decision. The numerous state cases re-
quiring federal judicial review would seem a dear
mandate to state prison administrators to assure
provident judgment at the primary level of prison
disciplinary decisions.
THE DETERMINATION BY THE COURT ON THE
MERITS OF WHETHER oR NOT THE DISCIPLINARY
DECISION WAS CORRECT
As has been suggested above, it is often difficult
to determine the method that a court employs to
reach its result in a particular prison disciplinary
case. Each case presents its own conceptual
questions: Is the non-justiciability doctrine a
fixed rule of law, or does its application vary with
the facts of each case? Is the requirement for
exhaustion of administrative remedies merely
another way to say the case is non-justiciable?
Is the federal abstention doctrine yet another way
to state the non-justiciability rule? Is there any
difference between the "exceptional case" justify-
102 ILL. R1v. STATr. ch 108, §§ 10 & 16 (1965).
103 Supra note 87.
104 See pp. 162-164 infra.
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ing judicial review and a case stating a cause of
action under the Civil Rights Act? Does non-
justiciability have the same meaning as applied
to state and federal prisoner petitions? Do the
remedies provided by the federal courts give the
same scope of review for a federal prisoner as
they do for a state prisoner? It is believed that
these questions are created by the desire of the
courts to decide each case on the merits before
satisfying their own requirements for "propriety
of review." This kind of judicial technique leads to
varying standards for any kind of judicial review
of prison disciplinary decisions. Recognizing then,
that the standards of justiciability which have been
set up by the courts may be nothing more than
judgments that no grounds for relief are stated,
the forthcoming analysis is essentially factual.
What kind of facts will persuade the court to act
despite some "propriety of review" rule which, if
strictly applied, would preclude review? It is
believed that the most convenient way to present
such a factual analysis is to classify cases according
to the type of disciplinary punishment inflicted
with correlation to the prison rule violated'05 as
well as the remedy for judicial review. As a begin-
ning point, the courts have recognized that the
administration of any form of punishment for rule
infraction is a delicate matter involving many
interests 0 6
106 Prison rules may certainly vary, but an example of
a set of rules are those of the Iowa State Penitentiary:
Altering clothing; bed not properly made; clothing
not in proper order; communicating by signs; creating a
disturbance; crookedness; defaming anything; dila-
toriness; dirty cell or furnishings; disorderly cell;
disobedience of orders; disturbance in cell house;
fighting; grimacing; hands in pocket; hands or face
not clean; hair not combed; having contraband on
your person or in your cell; impertinence to visitors;
insolence to officers; insolence to foreman; insolence to
fellow-inmate; insolence at work; inattentive in line;
inattentive in school; laughing and fooling; loud
talking in cell; loud reading in cell; malicious mischief;
neglect of study; not out of bed promptly; not weaing
outside shirt; not properly out of cell when brake is
drawn; out of place in shop or line; profanity; quarrel-
ing; refusal to obey; shirking; spitting on floor; staring
at visitors; stealing; trading; talking in chapel; talking
from cell to cell; talking in corridor; talking in line;
throwing away food; vile language; wasting food;
writing unauthorized letters. RuiN, et al., TEE LAW
or Cnmn'NAL CoRREc'iox ch 8, § 14, n. 113 (1963).
101 Punishment "must in many instances be
summary, and ... administered to a convict for a
violation of prison rules may differ quantitatively and
qualitatively from the punishment prescribed by a
criminal statute and imposed initially by a court
following an individual's conviction of a crime."
Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark.
1965).
Corporal Punishment
"Statutes in nine states expressly permit
corporal punishment, usually attaching pro-
tections such as the presence of a physician or
a lapse of time between the infraction and the
punishment. Ten states prohibit whipping or
striking." 107
A recent example of judicial review of corporal
punishment is Talley v. Stephens,0 3 where corporal
punishment was authorized in Arkansas by prison
rule.109 The prisoner alleged that he had been
whipped some seventy times for insufficient work,
and that this amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment."0 Stating that while corporal punish-
ment was not per se unconstitutional, the court
made it clear that its infliction must be "surrounded
by appropriate safeguards." as The court held that
the petitioner had stated a good cause of action
under the Civil Rights Act, and enjoined further
such corporal punishment because it was not
"surrounded by appropriate safeguards" as
required by the court. m Apparently, the injunction
was ignored by the state prison authorities in-
volved, for their actions were again brought into
question by the same court as the result of an
investigation into alleged atrocities in the state
prisons.313
107 RuBiN, et al., Ta LAW or CanmiuAL CoRREcTIox
ch. 8, Sec. 14 (1963).
105 Supra note 106.
101 ".... whenever in the judgement of the Superin-
tendent it appears that such punishment is necessary
to maintain prison discipline or to enforce respect
for Penitentiary policies." Supra note 106, at 687-88.
no "The question is whether the use of the strap at
the Arkansas Penitentiary is cruel and unusual punish-
ment in the constitutional sense." Supra note 106,
at 689.
n "it must not be excessive; it must be inflicted as
dispassionately as possible and by reasonable people;
and it must be applied in reference to recognizable
standards whereby a convict may know what conduct
on his part will cause him to be whipped and how much
punishment given conduct may produce." Supra note
106, at 691.
1 "As administered at the Penitentiary, that
punishment consists of blows with a leather strap
five feet in length, four inches wide, and about one-
fourth inch thick, attached to a wooden handle or
shaft about six inches long. Ordinarily, the punishment
is inflicted by the Assistant Warden having in his
charge the inmate to be punished. A prisoner who is
to be whipped is required to lie down on the ground
fully clothed, and the blows are inflicted on his but-
tocks." Supra note 106, at 687.
M Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark.
June 3, 1967). This case was the result of the Arkansas
prison scandal uncovered late in 1966. The meticulous
factual detail used by the court in Jackson describes a
return to the Dark Ages in prison administration. The
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Earlier cases have held that where whipping was
specifically authorized by statute, and the manner
of infliction was carefully controlled, any complaint
for abuse was remedial only in the state courts,
and that the alleged abuse did not amount to a
denial of federally protected rights under the
Civil Rights Act.n4 Thus, it would appear that
the federal courts are primarily worried about the
environment of corporal punishment, and will
insist on either a statute or specific prison regula-
tions to insure the constitutionality of its inflic-
tion.
Solitary Confinement
"Solitary confinement is authorized by statute
in about half the states. It is prohibited only
in Louisiana, and is actually used in almost
every prison. The statutes sometimes limit the
amount of it that may be imposed and may
require periodic examinations of the prisoner
by a doctor." "I
It has been repeatedly held by the federal
courts that punishment by solitary confinement
is constitutional, if reasonably inflicted and super-
vised.n" Recent federal cases show that additional
facts need be proved to raise a constitutional
issue." 7 An astounding example of unconstitutional
techniques used by the prison officials exceeded mere
punishments and amounted to torture of the inmates.
The methods included use of a "teeter board," a
"crank telephone" shocking device, and whipping
against the bare skin with a strap. The court again
enjoined the use of these "punishments" under the
Civil Rights Act. Id. at 815-16.
14 Threatt v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 858
(N.D.N.C. 1963).
I' "RuBr et at., TE LAW OF CanrTAL CoRaEcTIoN
ch. 8, § 14 (1963).
U1 When solitary confinement is imposed pursuant
to a reasonable state statute directing and controlling
it, and it cannot be shown that there is a violation of
the state statute, no cause of action is stated under the
Civil Rights Act. Wright v. McMann, 257 F. Supp.
739, 743 (N.D.N.Y. 1966). See also cases cited in
Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 430 (D. Md.
1966).
n7 The following cases were held not to state a cause
of action: Blythe v. Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex.
1961) (prisoner alleged he was placed in solitary
confinement shortly after surgery in an "unclean and
unhealthy" cell); Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921
(D. Col. 1962) (prisoner alleged deprivation of food,
water and toilet paper for fifty-two hours); Roberts v.
Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966) (prisoner
alleged twenty-seven hours in an isolation cell and
sixteen days in "semi-segregation"); Labat v. Mc-
Keithen, 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966) (all prisoners
awaiting the death penalty were kept in solitary
confinement until their execution). However, it has
recently been recognized that a deprivation of es-
sential medical care while the prisoner is in solitary
confinement is actionable under the Civil Rights Act.
solitary confinement is the recent case of Jordan v.
Fitzharris.n s The facts in this case are hard to
believe in an age of sophisticated penology. While
the plaintiff was an inmate of a California state
prison he was confined in a six-by-eight-foot
"strip cell" used for prisoners who were allegedly
"beyond the reach of ordinary controls and prison
directives." The cell was constructed of solid
concrete, with exception of a door made of bars
and screen. The door could be covered to darken
the cell by a metal flap. There were no furnishings
in the cell, with the exception of a commode toilet
that could not be flushed from inside the cell.
Heat and ventilation were supplied by two small
ducts located high on the rear wall of the cell.
With the door flap down no light or air could be
admitted to the cell; except for fifteen minutes a
day the flap was dosed and the plaintiff remained
in total darkness. The commode was flushed two
times a day by an outside guard. The plaintiff's
complaint best describes life in the "strip cell." U9
United States v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425, 426 (7th Cir.
1964). This rule is applied to federal prisons too,
although not under the Civil Rights Act. Edwards v.
Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994 (4th Cir. 1966).
I' 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
U During plaintiff's confinement in said strip
cell, the strip cell was never cleaned. As
a result of the continuous state of filth to which
plaintiff was subjected, plaintiff was often
nauseous and vomited, and the vomit was
never cleaned from the plaintiff's cell. When
the plaintiff was first brought to the strip cell,
the floor and walls of the strip cell were covered
with the bodily wastes of previous inhabitants
of the strip cell... said strip cell had not been
cleaned for at least thirty days before plain-
tiff was confined therein.
Plaintiff was forced to remain in said strip cell
for twelve days without any means of cleaning
his hands, body or teeth. No means was
provided which could enable plaintiff to clean
any part of his body at any time. Plaintiff was
forced to handle and eat his food without even
the semblance of cleanliness or any provision
for sanitary conditions.
For the first eight days of plaintiff's confine-
ment in said strip cell, plaintiff was not per-
mitted clothing of any nature and was forced
to remain in said strip cell absolutely naked.
Thereafter, plaintiff was given a pair of rough
overalls only.
Plaintiff was forced to remain in said strip cell
with no place to sleep but upon the cold concrete
floor of the strip cell, except that a stiff canvas
mat approximately 42 feet by 5X feet was
provided. Said mat was so stiff that it could not
be folded to cover plaintiff without such
conscious exertion by plaintiff that sleep was
impossible. Plaintiff is six feet and one inch
tall and could not be adequately covered by
said stiff canvas mat even when holding said
mat over himself. The strip cell was not heated
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The plaintiff also alleged that the lower rank
prison personnel had authority to confine the
plaintiff in the strip cell for up to sixty days, and
that he was in continual fear of such confinement.
Deprivation of medical care was also alleged."'
The plaintiff sustained his burden of proof, largely
on his own testimony, for all of his allegations.
The court called his testimony "dear and con-
vincing," 2 1 and was so incensed with the prisoner's
punishment that it almost ridiculed the meager
defense put forth by the defendants."' The court
was similarly sarcastic when dealing with the
defense offered to the plaintiff's allegation of
deprivation of medical care.123
Holding that the strip cell was cruel and unusual
punishment,124 the court permanently enjoined
the defendant-superintendent from subjecting the
plaintiff to such confinement as violative of the
Civil Rights Act.12' The court also defined the
conditions of solitary confinement that are needed
to satisfy the constitutional test of the Eighth
Amendment:
"It is perfectly apparent to this court that
during the time that the plaintiff was forced to
remain there.
Id. at 677. Photographs of the "strip cell" are appended
to the reported case.
120 "Plaintiff has been denied adequate medical care
prior to, during, and subsequent to said confinement
in said strip cell, despite repeated oral and written
requests for same made in good faith by or on behalf of
plaintiff." Id. at 677-78.
2 Id. at 678.
m "It is evident from... Jordan's testimony that
he was required to eat the meager prison fare in the
stench and filth that surrounded him, together with
the accompanying odors that ordinarily permeated the
cell. Absent the ordinary means of cleansing his hands
preparatory to eating, it was suggested by the prison
consulting psychiatrist... that he might very well use
toilet paper for this purpose plus his small ration of
water, being two cups a day." Ibid.
"' "As evidence of the limited medical care provided,
the official records demonstrate that [a doctor] came
into the wing where the strip cells are located and spent
eight minutes on one occasion and ten minutes on
another occasion, thus servicing the one hundred and
eight inmates." Ibid.
14The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); hence cruel and unusual punishment is a proper
subject of relief by the Civil Rights Act.
ns In so holding, the court once again expressed its
astonishment at the punishment: "When, as it appears
in the case at bar, the responsible prison authorities
in the use of the strip cells have abandoned elemental
concepts of decency by permitting conditions to prevail
of shocking and debased nature, then the courts must
intervene-to restore the primal rules of a civilized
community in accord with the Constitution of the
United States." Jordan v. Fitzharris, supra note 118,
at 680.
whether a man is confined in a strip cell, or in
solitary confinement, he is entitled to receive
the essentials of survival. The essentials of
survival necessarily include the elements of
water and food and requirements for basic
sanitation." 12
The test of the Jordan case, and cases decided
since, have marked out fairly definite boundaries
by which to review prison disciplinary decisions
which impose solitary confinement."'
CONCLUSION
The problems of prison administration, especially
the maintenance of internal discipline, are far more
complex than the scope of this article. It is realized
that the task of prison administration, by its very
nature, cannot be overburdened by technicalities
of "due process" in the same magnitude as the
outside world. To do so would dearly defeat most
concepts of criminal imprisonment. Imprisonment
is punishment, and prisoners cannot expect, nor
are they entitled to receive, the same methodical
treatment by the law once they are lawfully
incarcerated as they received during the proceed-
ings leading to their initial incarceration. If we are
to punish criminal offenders by imprisonment, we
must, of necessity, surrender their management to
those charged with that duty. Yet it is clear that
our system of law does not give the prisoner up for
lost; he is not the "end product" of the criminal
law. There are times when the courts will not
defer to the wisdom and judgment of the keeper,
but to the end of enforcing that basic code of
human rights, the Constitution. Such an intrusion
into the stewardship of prisons is completely
justified when the custodians have ignored that
which no man can be denied. Prisons should not be
permitted to operate independently of the external
standard of judicial review. The lines of permissible
conduct are difficult to draw, but yet are necessary
to define the competing interests involved. This,
however, is the traditional function of the courts:
To resolve competing interests where the rights of
man are affected. The establishment and guarantee
of the fundemental rights of prisoners is but
another continuing obligation of our jurisprudence.
"2 Id. at 682. This test was applied by the same court
in a case subsequent to Jordan, but it was held that
the facts alleged did not amount to unconstitutional
solitary confinement. Cullum v. Dept. of Correction,
267 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
"'See Graham v. Willingham, 265 F. Supp. 763 (D.
Kan 1967), where the court described in detail life in
"the hole," yet determined that conditions were
within the boundaries of constitutional requirements.
See also note 126 supra.
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